Principles of Conflict

— Émile Bayard, 19th century

Why would a bear flee from a house cat? That’s the sort of question I’ve been considering while developing a conflict resolution system. I previously detailed the impetus behind this project in “On Conflict & Violence,” which I’d recommend reading first for context.

So why would a bear flee from a house cat when bears have been known to maul and even kill humans? My first light-bulb moment was the realization that I’d phrased the question wrong. After all, why wouldn’t a bear flee from a house cat? A bear startled by a house cat stands to lose nothing by fleeing, whereas a bear whose cubs are threatened stands to lose everything—and thus is infinitely more dangerous. This leads to my first principle of conflict:

Higher stakes yield worse fallout.

A belligerent prepared to fight to the death faces greater risk than one who surrenders at the mere sight of a blade—and so do those who oppose them.

The sheer reckless aggression of the house cat may be another reason why the bear would flee. The bear not only stands to lose nothing by fleeing, it also gains nothing from fighting, whereas the cat has initiated the conflict as though it has nothing to lose. Many conflicts simply amount to a game of Chicken; the side most committed to victory—and thus with greater risk tolerance—tends to prevail. Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis has been analyzed through the lens of game theory as a game of Chicken, though more recent analysis has cast doubt on that interpretation.¹

It’s worth noting that John Von Neumann, widely considered to be the father of mathematical game theory, focused much of his early analysis on poker. And one might describe game theory as the mathematics of conflict. It’s fitting then, that Vincent Baker adopted a poker-inspired procedure of “raising” and “seeing” for Dogs In the Vineyard, which inspires my own design. All this to say, there’s precedence behind this next principle:

Escalation begets escalation—or compels surrender.

A belligerent embroiled in a conflict may either escalate, which may cause the opposition to forfeit, or forfeit themselves.

And now everything begins to come together. Because fallout threatens to become more severe as the stakes of a conflict heighten, and because belligerents escalate a conflict based on how significant its outcome is to them, it stands to reason that:

Escalation always comes at an appropriate cost.

A promise may encourage coercion, a threat may sour an accord, and violence may inflict injury or death.

In other words, if players escalate a conflict by invoking an alliance, any fallout they suffer will directly relate to that alliance. It’s also important to me that fallout be dependent on the belligerents themselves. Fighting one bear-sized cat would not be the same as fighting a dozen cat-sized bears. Deceiving a baker would result in different consequences than deceiving a duke would.

Belligerents influence fallout.

A deadlier foe inflicts more grievous wounds. And while one may respond to extortion by going into hiding, another may hire assassins.

These principles not only feel intuitive to me, but they also address specific design problems. I wrote previously that “combat as war is insufficient,” and here I’ll expand on that. The Basic edition of D&D recommends that the DM check monster morale “after a side’s first death” and “when 1/2 the monsters have been incapacitated” (B27). Unless the player characters retreat, every combat in Basic D&D is a fight to the death—and often to a catastrophic degree. I aim to develop a system that actively enables an impartial referee to adjudicate conflicts with less-lethal consequences, including conflicts that end as soon as a blade is drawn—or even before then.

Such a system must enable the referee to determine in a non-arbitrary manner whether or not an individual belligerent would surrender under highly specific circumstances. This system must also empower an impartial referee to impose consequences for violent and non-violent conflicts alike.

I’m attempting to shift focus away from the often monotonous micro decisions involved in the tactical skirmish minigame of D&D combat in favor of richer macro decisions: when to engage in a conflict, how far to escalate a conflict, and how much risk to incur.

I feel motivated rather than discouraged by these design challenges. If I am able to meet them, a rich and novel play experience will be the reward. I’m tantalized by the promise of a game in which alliances, laws, and knowledge are wielded as often as swords, and in which a token of favor, a written decree, or the discovery of a secret may prove more potent than sorcery.

From Principles to Procedure

Here, I’ll outline in non-mechanical terms the broad strokes of the conflict resolution procedure I’ve developed. It consists of four phases:

Phase One: Escalation

During the escalation phase, belligerents escalate the conflict through non-violent means, establishing the stakes, telegraphing their commitment to victory, and incurring greater risk through each act of escalation. Means of escalating a conflict include:

• Offering a bribe
• Asserting authority
• Redeeming a favor
• Instilling fear
• Declaring an allegiance
• Swearing an oath
• Issuing a threat
• Rousing desire
• Invoking the law

Note that there’s a loose hierarchy to means of escalation; a belligerent unmoved by the threat of a curse upon their bloodline isn’t likely to be swayed by a mere bribe. That said, each belligerent has unique desires, hopes, and fears. Discovering and applying leverage thus becomes crucial to winning a conflict without violence. If neither side yields during the escalation phase, proceed to phase two.

Phase Two: Precipice

The precipice phase represents belligerents’ last chance to resolve a conflict without bloodshed. During the precipice phase, belligerents brandish their weapons, take up formation, and otherwise flex their might. They have one last opportunity to assess their tactical advantages and disadvantages before committing to combat. If neither side proves willing to surrender without a fight, the conflict escalates to phase three.

Phase Three: Descent (Into Violence)

During the descent phase, belligerents commit to an approach (cautious, balanced, or reckless), and the players and referee calculate the relative might of the opposing sides. Note that a cautious approach contributes less might than a balanced approach, which in turn contributes less might than a reckless approach. The losing side may opt to surrender or fight to the last.

Phase Four: Fallout

The fallout phase concludes every conflict, regardless of whether it ended during phase one or was sustained through phases two or three. First, the referee confirms the degree of risk for each side:

• In violent and non-violent conflicts alike, escalation incurs risk.
• In violent conflicts, a reckless approach incurs greater risk than a balanced approach, which in turn incurs greater risk than a cautious approach.
• In violent conflicts, the outnumbered side incurs greater risk.

The referee then determines fallout:

• In non-violent conflicts, the fallout depends both on the belligerents and the means of escalation.
• In violent conflicts, reckless belligerents suffer more severe fallout than those who take a balanced approach, and so on.
• In violent conflicts, the losing side suffers more severe fallout—and more severe still if routed.
• In violent conflicts, one side’s threat level may impose more severe fallout on the opposition.
• In violent conflicts, the losing side suffers more severe fallout if they fight to the last.
• In violent conflicts, the winning side suffers less severe fallout if the opposition surrenders.

In Practice

• Players should take care in deciding whether to escalate a conflict—and how, as different means of escalation will present different risks.
• By telegraphing their willingness to fight to the death, one side may cause the other side to surrender before the conflict descends into violence. But overcommitting against a resolute opponent may prove disastrous.
• The better one side understands the other’s motivations, the more easily they can win a conflict without violence.
• A group of low-threat belligerents (i.e. goblins) will impose many relatively minor instances of fallout, whereas a single high-threat belligerent (i.e. an ogre) will impose fewer yet more severe instances of fallout.
• In a conflict against a weaker opponent, a mightier belligerent has the luxury of taking a cautious approach, winning the conflict while mitigating risk.
• A relatively weak belligerent can defeat a mightier opponent by incurring more risk than the other will accept.
• As in systems with morale, undead are a uniquely terrifying threat because they fight recklessly and never surrender.
• A brief, non-violent conflict typically involves two or three die rolls. Even a violent conflict requires only one or two dice rolls per player and a manageable number from the referee.

What Comes Next

Playtesting! I have a busy winter ahead of me, but I’ll post playtest reports as soon as I can manage.

1. Frank C. Zagare, “A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 2014 ↩︎